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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mario Ruiz appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine. Specifically, Ruiz
challenges the district court's ruling that limited Ruiz's cross-examination of a
state's witness.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedincls
Ruiz sold methamphetamine to Josh Morrison. ( T .1 p.66, L.23 - p.68,
L.13;p.99,L.17-p.l00, L.3;p.153, L.13-p.157,L.18.)

Morrison,inturn,sold

the methamphetamine to a confidential informant, Megan Larson. ( T . p.23,
Ls.15-23; p.68, Ls.14-20; p.99, L.17 - p.100, L.3; p.129, Ls.4-15; p.130, Ls.9-14;
p.139, Ls.22-24; p.146, Ls.23-25; p.157, Ls.20-25; p.170, Ls.19-20.) The state
charged Morrison and Ruiz with trafficking in methamphetamine. (R., pp.16-19.)
Ruiz pled not guilty. (R., p.23.) At Ruiz's jury trial, Morrison and Larson testified
against Ruiz. (Tr., pp.59-102; 146-159; 169-177.) The jury found Ruiz guilty of
trafficking in methamphetamine. (R., pp.38-39; Tr., p.211, L.25 - p.212, L.16.)
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Ruiz to a unified term of ten
years with three years fixed. (R., pp.57-61; Tr., p.228, L.18 - p.229, L.2.) Ruiz
timely appealed. (R., pp.62-65; 71-74.)

'

The record contains two transcripts, one including jury selection and opening arguments and
another that transcribes the rest of the trial and Ruiz's sentencing hearing. The state will only cite
to the transcript containing the main portion of the trial and the sentencing hearing. That
transcript will be referenced herein as "Tr."

1

Ruiz states the issues on appeal as:
Did the district court commit reversible error in limiting Mr. Ruiz's
cross-examination of a key prosecution witness?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Ruiz failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it ruled
that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of
evidence that Ruiz faced a mandatory minimum sentence of three years while a
state's witness, Morrison, avoided the mandatory minimum because of his plea
agreement with the state?

ARGUMENT
Ruiz Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Ruled That The Danqer Of Unfair Preiudice Substantiallv Outweiahed The
Probative Value Of Evidence That Ruiz Faced A Mandatory Minimum Sentence
Of Three Years While A State's Witness, Morrison, Avoided The Mandatory
Minimum Because Of His Plea Aareement With The State
A.

Introduction
Ruiz asserts that the district court committed reversible error when it held

that cross-examination of a state's witness, Morrison, regarding mandatory
minimum sentences applicable to trafficking in methamphetamine was
inadmissible. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Specifically, Ruiz argues that the limitation
on cross-examination violated his "Constitutional right to confrontation, as well as
ldaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) Ruiz's claims
fail. The record demonstrates that the district court did not abuse its discretion
under applicable evidentiary standards when it limited the cross-examination of
Morrison.
B.

Standard of Review
Whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse

witnesses was violated is a question of law over which appellate courts exercise
free review. State v. Hooper, 145 ldaho 139, ---, 176 P.3d 911, 914 (2007). The
trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its judgment will
be reversed only when there has been an abuse of that discretion. State v.
Howard, 135 ldaho 727, 731-32, 24 P.3d 44, 48-49 (2001); State v. Zimmerman,
121 ldaho 971, 974, 829 P.2d 861 (1992).

C.

The Record Demonstrates That The District Court Pro~erlvExercised Its
Discretion When It Limited The Cross-Examination Of Morrison
"The control of cross-examination of a witness is committed to the sound

discretion of the trial judge, and absent a showing of prejudice, a limitation of
cross-examination imposed by a trial judge will not be overturned on appeal."
State v. Marek, 112 ldaho 860, 867, 736 P.2d 1314, 1321 (1987) (citing State v.

Pierce, 107 ldaho 96, 685 P.2d 837 (Ct. App.

1984)). See also, State v. Brown,

109 ldaho 981, 984-95, 712 P.2d 682, 685-86 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Wheeler,
109 ldaho 795, 798, 711 P.2d 741, 745 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Brazzell, 118
Idaho 431, 436, 797 P.2d 139, 144 (Ct. App. 1990). "The jury's function . . . is to
determine guilt or innocence, regardless of penalty."

Pierce,107 ldaho 96, 104-

105, 685 P.2d 837, 845-846 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing State v. Altwatter, 29 ldaho
107, 157 P. 256 (1916)). Ruiz has failed to show that the district court abused its
discretion by ruling that evidence of the penalties Ruiz might face if convicted
was inadmissible.
The

state charged both Ruiz and Morrison with trafficking

methamphetamine.

(R., pp.16-19.)

in

Morrison testified on direct and cross-

examination that his testimony was provided as part of a plea bargain pursuant to
which the state reduced his trafficking charge to delivery of a controlled
substance. (Tr., p.60, Ls.25; p.72, Ls.9-14; p.79, L.13 - p.80, L.7.) Morrison
also testified on direct examination that, as part of the plea agreement, the state
would recommend probation and jail time. (Tr., p.61, Ls.1-3.) During Morrison's
cross-examination, the state moved to preclude Ruiz from questioning Morrison
about the mandatory minimum sentence for trafficking, three years in prison, that

was no longer applicable to Morrison because of the plea agreement. (Tr., p.74,

The state contended this testimony was inadmissible. (Tr., p.74, Ls.1517.) Ruiz objected to any limitation of his cross-examination of Morrison about
this aspect of the plea agreement because "[the state] opened the door regarding
probation in this case. And if [the jury is] going to take that into consideration,
[the jury has] got to know what this guy is facing." (Tr., p.74, Ls.18-22.) The
court noted that while Ruiz had the right to challenge Morrison's credibility, "the
jury is not to be advised of the penalties that the defendant might face, if
convicted." (Tr., p.76, Ls.21-23.)
The court stated:
You can . . . make an inquiry with regard to the maximum
sentence that he could receive. You can make an inquiry with
regard to the fact that he is receiving a recommendation from the
State [for] a significantly lesser sentence.

I will not let you get into the fact that this defendant faces a
minimum mandatory sentence of three years. I think the fact that
[Morrison] has cut a deal in which the State is going to recommend
a far less than a life sentence makes the point without having to
get into minimum mandatories.
(Tr., p.75, L.5-p.76, L.1.)
After this ruling, Ruiz went on to further cross-examine Morrison as
follows:
[I]n that deal that for exchange for your testimony
[Ruiz]:
today that you would receive -- your charges would be reduced
from trafficking in methamphetamine to delivery of a controlled
substance. Right?
[Morrison]:

Yes

[Ruiz]:
Okay. And in the sentence recommendation that the
State will hold themselves to generally will be that you will be put
on probation. Correct?
[Morrison]:

Yes.

[Ruiz]:
And pursuant to probation, you will serve some jail
time. Correct?
[Morrison]:

To my knowledge, yes.

[Ruiz]:

Yeah. But you don't know how much jail time?

[Morrison]:

No.

[Ruiz]:

But you know it is going to be some jail time?

[Morrison]:

Yeah.

[Ruiz]:
Correct?

And that will all be argued at your sentencing.

[Morrison]:

Yes.

[Ruiz]:

And that you haven't pled yet. Correct?

[Morrison]:

No, I have not.

[Ruiz]:

They are waiting for your testimony today. Right?

[Morrison]:

Yes

[Ruiz]:
And that basically you have escaped, by those
reduction of charges, you have escaped a prison sentence.
Correct?
[Morrison]: I would hardly call it escape.
consequences for my poor choices.

I am still facing

[Ruiz]:

Right. But you're going to be put on probation?

[Morrison]:

Yeah

(Tr., p.79, L.13-p.81, L.10.)

On appeal, Ruiz argues that because he "was not allowed to ask Mr.
Morrison the critical questions that would have allowed the jury to understand
why delivery of methamphetamine was considered a 'lesser' charge, to
comprehend just how significant it is for a defendant to have his charge reduced

. . . and, to ultimately, appreciate the tremendous incentive for Mr. Morrison" to
testify against Ruiz, the district court denied Ruiz's Sixth Amendment
confrontation right. (Appellant's brief, p.13 (emphasis in original).) Ruiz also
argues that in limiting Morrison's cross-examination, the district court abused its
discretion in the application of ldaho Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403 by
excluding relevant evidence with probative value that "was 'substantially
outweighed' by any countervailing interests identified in Rule 403." (Appellant's
brief, p.18-19.)
"The court's discretion should be exercised to allow a criminal defendant
considerable latitude in cross-examining witnesses; but a limitation imposed by
the judge will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing of prejudice."

m,107 ldaho 96, 104, 685 P.2d 837, 846.
similar to Ruiz's case.

Pierce presented a

situation

In that case, Pierce argued that "the district court

erroneously prevented him from cross-examining [a witness] about a plea
bargain he made with the state."

107 ldaho at 104, 685 P.2d at 845. The trial

judge in Pierce would not allow cross-examination of a witness about the
maximum penalties for crimes that included the crime for which Pierce was on
trial.

Id. The ldaho Court of Appeals held that:
Because the jury was informed of the plea bargain, because
Pierce was allowed to inquire substantially into the nature of that

plea bargain, and because [the witness] had not yet actually been
sentenced . . . the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by merely
restricting further inquiry into comparable penalties for different
offenses.
Id., 107 Idaho at 105, 685 P.2d at 846.
Contrary to Ruiz's arguments, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in limiting the cross-examination of Morrison, because the record demonstrates
that the district court properly exercised its discretion. The jury in Ruiz's case
heard testimony about Morrison's plea bargain during both the direct and crossexamination of him. The district court allowed Ruiz to cross-examine Morrison
extensively about that plea bargain with the state-including

the fact that

Morrison would not face prison. Like the witness in Pierce,Morrison had not yet
been sentenced when he testified at Ruiz's trial. The trial court allowed the jury
to hear ample evidence demonstrating the potential biases and credibility issues
inherent in Morrison's testimony As a result, the district court did not abuse its
discretion, and Ruiz was not prejudiced, by limiting the cross-examination of
Morrison to prevent the jury from hearing the mandatory minimum penalty Ruiz
faced if convicted.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Ruiz's conviction and
sentence.
DATED this

lothday of June 2008.
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